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THE IMPACT OF THE
REPEAL OF THE STOCK
FOR-DEBT EXCEPTION ON

CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
RESTRUCTURINGS
William D. Terando
Wayne H. Shaw·
Introduction
This paper examines the effect of the repeaf of the stock-fm
debl exception on corporate bankruptcy restfllcturings. This
exception permitted corporations to exclude CancelJation o(
lndebtedness (COD) income from gross income provided they
exchanged their own common equity fo.. debt whi Ie in Chapter
11. Because no COD income was recognized, the bankrupt
corporation also avoIded any redut.1ion in tax atlributes (prima..•
ily Net Operating tossest or NOls). Under the new raw, finns
{hal restructure in Chapter 11 are required to recognize COO
income but can defer current taxation on tnese amounts by
reducing NOls by a like-amount

Prior researcn has provided contrasting assessments as to the
importance of this exception to bankruptcy filers and differing
predictions as to their response to its repeal. Betker [1995J
claims that most bankrupt firms received little. if any, benefit
from avoiding COD income under the prior law because their
debt restructure method required them to incur a greater than
fifty-point change In underlying ownership (O'Nnership change).
As il result, they were forced to rely on another advanrageous
exception provided in the tilx code (ownership change rule
bankruptcy exception) to preservE! NOls because [pg. 4J: "'it
puts a less restrictive limitation on the annual use of NOLs.'"
Since the change in tax law repealed the tax exception that fjrms
did not rely on (stock-for-debt exception) and left substantiaHy
• "fhe author.; are, res.pe.;;tively, ell Iowa. State Univers.iry ;toO $(Mhem Meth
odil>t Univer:sity.
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intact the -exception that firms did rely on (ownership change
rule bankruptcy exception), Betker's {lq951 findings imply that
the c:nange in tax law sl10uid not have a significant impact On
corporate bankruptcy restructuring;.

In contrast, Easton n9941 asserts that the repeal is "the single
most signiflcant change in tax law governiog bankruptcy"
because it requires firms that exchange common equity with
debt-holders (or impaired debt to reduce .one of thejr most
valuable assets: NOL tax auributes. This reductiol1 t in turn,
reduces the NOt tax benefit available to firms that trigger an
ownership change in bankruptcy because the deferral of COD
income and the application of the ownership change rule
bankruptcy exceptioll are not necessarily independent: to the
extent firms have rower available NOLs the ability of the
ownership change bankruptcy exception to pre~rve NOls is
also reducEd. Newton and Wertheim (1993) predict tnat bank
rupt firms will respond to the im::reased tax cost of using
l:ommon equity under the new law by issuing more debt. This
allows them to reduce the amount of COD income recognized
and approximate the NOl tax benefits available to bankruptcy
filers under the prior law. They exprESS concern, however, that
this. strategy will reduce lhe probabrlity of the firm incurring a
successful bankruptcy restructuring by forcing it to exit Chapter
11 with relatively higher levels of debt in their capital structure.
We predict they will have incentive to do so when the marginal
lax benefit of preserving NOL tax attributes exceeds the mar
ginal financial statement costs ofexiUng bankruptcy with more
debt.
We examine these competing prediclions using a sample of
firms that successfully emerged from Chapter J1 between 1994
and 2004. We show that. under the current law, bankruptcy
filers continued to issue common equity in sufficient amounts
to trigger an ownership change when restructuring impaired
debt with debt-holders. Consistent with Easton [1994], how~
ever, we find that the deferral of COD income increased the
tax cos.t of common equity and in many cases forced bankruptcy
filers to altflr how they restructured in Chapter 11 to preserve
NOls. The specific response, however, is more complicated
than that suggested by NeViton and Wertheim {1993J because
tile change in tax law divides firms into three sub-groups based
on tne trade-off between tht! tax benefits of preserving NOt tax
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attributes and the related financial reporting costs of issuing

more debt.'
The first group consists of firf115 that recognized COD income
in excess of NOl tax attributes. Consistent with Easton [1994J,
the repeal imposed a significant explicit tax cost on this group
by eliminating the NOl tax benefit they would have rE!(;:eived
under the prior law from triggering an ownership change in
bankruptcy. In addition to eliminating their post-emergence
NOh, these firms were also required to m.ake additional reduc
tions to their other tax attributes (primarily the bases deprecia
ble assets) by the amount of excess COD income recognized
(averagi ng S147 mill ion per firm}. Despite these €>eplicit tax
costs, we snow thatthey<wefe precluded (rom issuing more debt
because the marginal financial rctx>rting costs of doing so far
exceeded the marginal tax benefit that could be obtained from
preserving additional NOl tax attrihutes.

or

The second set of firms continued to benefit from receiving

a less restrictive annual limitation on NOL tax attributes. Consis~
tent with the concerns of Newton and Wertheim (1993), these
firms responded to the change in the tax law by issuing more
debt. This allowed them to SCllI'e approximately $]3 million of
additional post-emergence NOLs (in present value, or PV
terms), as opposed to a workout, but also forced them to exit
Chapter 11 with Significantly higher debt ratios and lower
profitability. We provide evidence suggesting that this strategy
was efficienl because the marginal tax benefits of preserving
NOL tax attributes for this group exceeded the marginal finan
cial reporting costs of exiting bankruptcy with higher debt levels
and reduced profitability.
Rather than issuing more debt, (he final group of firms elected
to reduce rhe adverse rax (:osts associated with the change in
tax law by choosing an alternative provision under the owner
ship change rule bankruptcy exception that provides for a one·
lime reduction in NOt tax attributes. This alternative restru<:tur
ing method allowed them to save approximately $77 million
of post-emerRence NOLs (or 92.6% of pre·restructure as.<;ets) by
restruc.turing in ralher than out of bankruptcy, and exit bank&
ruptcy with relatively lower debt ratios.
1 A Iotlrth small sub-group vi firms. le~fru(;tured primarily the tcfm~ or exiSl
ing ct~·bl contral1s and were primarily unaf(ec.:.red by the t:hange in tax law.
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Our conrribution to the literature is twofold. First, we show
how the repeal of the stock-for-debt exception impacted the tax
benefit provided by the ownership change bankruptcy excep
tion to firms that restructure in Chaptet 11, Second, we show
how the change in tax law provided incentive to these firms
to alter how they restructured in bankruptcy to preserve this
benefit and the importance of financial statement incentives in
this decision. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section two contains institutional iJ1formation regarding
the Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. -rhe effect of taxes on
bankruptcy restru1.1urings before and after the change in tax law
is examined in Sedion three. The hypotheses are developed in
Section four and [he sample selection method is discussed in
section five. Section six contains research design while the
results are presented in Section seven. Our conclusions are
presented In section eight.

Chapter 11
Tne rules and regulations governing the bankruptcy process
are contained iJ1 Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(Chapter 1 1). Manag@ment is allowed to retain control of the
firm after it enter> into bankruptcy and has the exclusive right
to propose the first plan of reo1'ganization to the Bankruptcy
Court (Court)." This plan must be submitted within 120 days
(or as late as 180 days) of the initial bankruptcy filing date. If
a plan is not submitted within this timeframe. any creditor dass
can propose their own reorganization plan. Each plan must
assign daimholders to various classes and propose an exchange
of property (cash or securities) by the firm for the debt held by
each designated class. -rhe value of property distributed is
determined by the absolute priority rule, under which a creditor
class is compensated for the face value of pre-.bankrupocy claims
only after the daims of each class deSignated as senior are
resolved. Plan acceptance requires an affirmative vote by a
majority (two-thirds in value and one-half in number) of daim~
holders in each class and is binding on all participants. To break
deadlocks, the Court can unilateriilily impose or "cram-down"
on dis~nting dasses a reorganization plan that it deems to be
IIfair and equitable".
lI'rhe Court can also appoint 3 [rulree 1.0 OVI:!~ opera.tioos if il1appmpriate
conduct on the part of maf}~emel1f is l!JSpecred.
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!n the late }980'5, a hybrid form of bankruplcy, called a
prepackaged bankruptcy (prepak) began appearing in the mar
ketplace. Prepacks are simifar to workouts in the sense that a
firm negotiates a reorganization plan with its creditors prior to
entering lnto Chapter 11 [McConnell and Servais, 1993). On
the other hand, they are similar to traditional Chapter ! 1
bankruptcies because the r~organilation occurs under the
auspice5 of the Court In most cast'S, the bankruptcy p~tition
and reorganization plan are filed concurrently with vote on the
reorganization plan occurring either snortly before (pre-voted)
or after (p05t-Vot't..lo(j} the finn enters into Chapter 11.

Tax Consequences of Restructuring in Bankruptcy
P!.io! Tax La,,!
Prior to 1995, the two most commonly cited tax conse
quences of restructuring in Chapter 11 were avoiding COD
income and preserving NOls {Betker. 19951. Corporate dis
cnarge of indebtednCi5 gives rise to ordinary income when the
cash and value of property used to si.ltisfy impaired debt is less
than its adjusted issue price.:. In this event. COD income arises
beC:::<luse the assets a debtor would otherwi5e be rt.--quired to
apply towards debt repayment are now (ree to be used fOf other
purposes." Under the stock-for-debt exception, firms could
exclude COD income from gross income pro'Vided tney ex·
changed tneir own stock to creditors tOf impaired debt white
in Chapter 11.- Because no COO income was recognized, the
.J COJ) iocume is chclra~il£d 01$ ()(dlnary ("ther th.ln cilpit,d gain
SirK"OO sal~ or t"x<.-hange i!> deemed to have OC(urred [lRC Regulation

income
Section

1.lll· lid !.m.
• Firms sh,.Jt U!>e ca~h (Of new debt) tD reslroc:lure imj)aired debt in (hdpM
I} l.111 defer current rtc'Cognitivll of COO illwme under the bankruptcy
exr.ej:IUon by reducing fax attributes bv a !ike amoont per IRe Section H18(a).
Under the ordering ru!~. NOb are fi~t reduced but Iht> debl:or may also elect
to reduce other l,i)x ..ttrif>utes tsych as the' bases ot depre(iabl~ :aS$eIS, gel'lHal
rn..sin<'Ss credits, alternative minimum tax credits, net capit.oll lo'>scs, piIls;ve
ac..tivily losses Clnd ioreigl1 lall. {.redih}.
• 'fht> exception was created through a liot'ries of rudki.. l dE'ci~jon~. Set' e.!.,
Commissioner v. Cdpl"l'Ito Sec. Corp., 47 8. LA. 1>91 (1 (42), nol1<ttq•• ;i(ff'fl
} 4n ~ ,~u ,;92 0 111 Cir. 1944); Alcazar tfott'l Inc. V. Cummissiol1et", 1 T.e.
on 1194}1 acq.; Claridge Ap,lrtments Co. V. Commis~jo".,r, 1 T.C U)
(!9~2.l, rev'd in p.'Irt. US f. 2<1962 (7111 Or. 1943); rev'd on uther groonQs,
323 U.S. 14) (l944). ac:q.; Commi~lijoner v. r.iotor Mart Trust, 4 T.e. 9'11
094.')) aff'd, 1SIl r. 2d t22 (1" Or. I(46), d(.q.; TOWCf Bldg. Corp. v.
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corporation al~o avoided any reduction in tax attributes.- The
exception was based on two perceived charac::teristics of the
impaired debt: (1) tnat it was merely being replaced with a
corporate stock liability (Pratt, 2004), and (2) its fair market
value (fMV) of the debt represented the anticipatory subscrip·
tion price of the common stock ultimately issued [Si!\'ef'man and

Keyes, 19(2).7'
MiHer {19911 suggt."5ts (hat the primary lax cost of restructur
Ing with common equity i5 associated with the triggering of an
ownership change under IRe Section 382. This occurs when
a group of 5 percent (or greater) shareholders increase their
ownership percentage o( qualifying stock (by value) by more
than fifty-percentage points during a three-year look-back pe
riod.- In this event, the amount of Hpre-change'" NOls that can
be applied against "post-cnange" taxable income is limited on
an annual basis to the product of the firm's i.lpre-cnange" equity
market capitalization and the applicable federal long-term tax~
exempt rate (annual limitation). If an ownership change is
triggered while tne firm is in Chapter 11 J however, the tax code
allow5 bankrupt finns to choose between two special provisions
contained within a special exception to the ownership c::hange
rules (Ownership Change Rule Bankruptcy Exception) to
Commissioner, b r.c. 125 {1946}, acq., Rev. Rut. 59.22.2,1959-1 C.B. aD;
TAM 873000); T A.M 37j.,){I07; TM18735006. Congre5$ indirectly rectJ.8oiled
this l!'xc:eptioo in the 8ankruptcy Act of 1980 by adding lRC Section 108(e)(8}
to limit its ilvailabihly
('(>"ain corporilliolls,
61n cases where bud.. Slocle and non-stock consideratiun was e~harlged
in sa'isb,clion of debt, the non-sloe1\: consideration WilS, applied iil'St 10 lhe
debt equal to !he 'Value of such cOnllidl:!'ration, with the stock satisfying the
remainder. This allowed finn!' to exclude the eobre amount of the COO in
come undeJ me stock~for-dd:>t exception CVef) though only a portion of the
(,Qn~idoralion t;onsisted of l'Ummon equity.
7 -rite stock-for-debt e"ception doe; not apply to "nominat or Iolen" issues
of <:vmmon t.'quily (IRe Secriorl 108(e){8)(A,) Of Iv eKcnanges of "disqu.1lifJed
stock" (preferred stot.:k} lot impai«'d debt (IRe Sec.tion 106(eJ(10)(B)), Firms
Ihat elN "insolvent'" lbook value of liabilities il)lC~ the fair market value of
assets) but not in ChJ.prcr 11 may .1150 utili.z~ the stock-for-debt exc.eption
but only to the e~nt of their ir'lKllve'l1cy. 'rhe t;ost of proving insolvency com
be alloided, however. by simply restnKluring in father than Otlt 01 Chapter

'0

11•

eQualifyiJ'lg lolOCk ior I~ porpose mdeterminins whether ~n ownership
change has been tri~ includes balh Commoll equity and common equity
oquivalen~, such a~ stock ()pti011!!., (.;o~rtible ~ferrod stock, .)Ild con~rlible
debt.
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preserve NOl tax attributes. The first provision {enhanced
valuation provj.~ion) provides for a less restrictive annual limita
tion amount by including in its. computational formula the value
of post~change equity market capitalir.ation. In most cases this
is likely to result in a highef NOl annual limitation ammlfit
since the firm is able to include the value of common equity
issued while in Chapter 11 in its computational formula.· The
second provision (artribute reduction provjsion) allows corpora
tions. to use their NOl tax a.ttributes without limitation in the
post·bi.mkruptcy period. Unrestricted NOl utilization in the
post-cnange period comes at oil cost,. however. Firstl each firm
must incur a one·rime NOL reduction ftoll charge) by: (1} one
half of the COO income that would have been recognized but
for the !:>tock-for~debt exception, and (2) the ~mount of interest
expense incurred in the previous three years leading up to and
including the year of bankruptcy.1t Second. they must canyon
a. significant amount of pre-change business in the post-change
period and avoid ~dditional common equity sufficient (0 trigger
ing a second ownership change within two Yl;?3fS or risk losing
all remaining NOLs. Weitzner [1994J suggests that firms chose
will choose the attribute reduction provision when the net
benefit that It provides (PV of post-emergence NOls less cost
of rt!stricted use of assets/financing options) exceeds the PV of
posr,emergence NOls tax benefit provided by the enhancoo
valuation provision.

t.

Change ;n the Tax l.aw
The repeal of the stock· for-debt exception is included as a
parI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(OBRA93). The new law applies to all corporate bankruptcy
(esrrucrurings after 1994, except IOf bankruptcy ~titions filed
Section 382(1)(6).
to Firms qualify {or this exct1)tion when their -pre-ch.mge" shareholOt>~ and
hislol ir: credilorS receive t.:ummol'! equity ff~preie"tios mort:' than 50% OJ the
owll<.'r!>hip of the newly reorganized company.
1"1 Beard l} 993, pg. Jh 11;" The rationale lot the iflle~s.t e)(pense redoction
-IRe

j~ that the equity interesl ret'E:'i\led by the l:~itor iKtui:llly ilr01i'E! well in
.1dv,mce Of the reo~Al1izatio". In effoct, .IS /he losies of the l"Ofpordtion
..,cumulate, Inc creditor gradually <1!il$UIl'le!o the tmition of ~ ... reholder, Wlmt
wa5 originally dt'(/ucted.iIS interest expenS(', ill'ld ..dded to the IO!;$ corporations
NOb, is now characterized a~ dillidetld5. Since dividl"l'lds are nondeducfible.
Ih(! dt'!du(tioos for interest are eliminated from the NOLs,"
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priOf to January 1, 1994. Under the new law, firms that ex
change common equity for deb[ are required to recognize COD
income upon debt discharge. Current taxation on these amounts
is deferred using the bankruptcy exception by reducing NOt
tax attributes by a like-amount While 00 changes were made
under the new law to the annual limitation computational
formula under the enhanced valuation exception, OBRA93
changed the statutory formula used to compute the one-time
NOL reduction under the tax attribute redudion eXf;eption.
Under the new rules, the NOl toll charge indudes only the
interest expense adjustment to conform to the repeal of the
stock·for-debt exception.

Hypotheses Development
Betker fl99S] examines the relative importance of the stock
for-debt and owners.hip cha.nge rufe bankruptcy exceptions to
firms that restructured in Chapt4;!f" 11 under the prior law and
suggests that tile primary tax benefit of restructuring in Chapter
11 during this rime period was not in preserving NOls per ~
by a.voidlng COD income. This is for two reasons. first, most
sample firms would have been able to exclude their COD
income had they reorganized as a workout due to insolvency
considerations. Second, no firm would have incurred current
taxes from debt forgiveness had they reorganiled as a work
our. ta Rather, he concludes that the primary benefit of restruc
turing in Chapter 11 is that [pg. 4]: . . it puts a less restrictive
limitation on the annual use of NOls'" rdative to a workout
because the advantageous provisions. of the ownership change
bankruptcy exception are not available to firms that restructure
out of bankruptcy. He estimates that the PV of future taxes saved
by firms rhal triggered an ownership change in rather than out
of bankruptcy was approximately $9 million per firm, or 3%

of total assets,
Since the change in tax law repealed the tax exception that
firms did not rely on !stock-for-debt exception) left substantially
intat1 the exception (hat firms did rely on (ownership change
rule bankruptcy exceplion), 8etker's {19951 findings imply that
the change in tax law will have lirtle, if any, impad on corporate
'2 Most sample firms in his >tudy triggered an (JWoelship l:hange while in
Chapter 11, TheS(' firms primcltily elecfed the enhanced valuation pmvi~ion
since they would have lost all (ur slJb~faJ1tiillly "Ii) oi their NOt lax attribiJte:J
hdd Ihey e-Ieded the attribute reduction provision.
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bankruptcy restructurings. Under the currenllaw, it is expected
that bankrupt firms will continue to rely on the le5s restrictive
annual NOL usage provisions of tne enhanced valuation provi~
sion to minimIze the relative cost of using common equity to
restructure impaired debt. This is stated in the following hypoth
esis (s.tated in the null form):

Hl: The repeal of th,g stock-for-debt exception will not cffect
how firms reorganize in Chapter 11
Eilston (1994), in contrast, asserts (hat tne repeal of the stock
for-.debt provision i~ "likely the single most significant change
in the tax law governing bankruptcy'" and "is a complete
turnaround from prior policies designed to help financially

distressed corporations to make a fresh start," He suggests that
the cha.nge in emphasis from exclusion to deferral of COD
income under the new law will decrease the value of bankrupt
firms by requiring them to reduce one of their most valuable
asse(s by the amount of COD income recognized: NOl tax
attributes. This in turn reduces the NOl tax benefit from trigger~
ing an ownership change in bankruptcy since there are fewer
NOI s avai lable to be preserved upon appl ication of the owner

ship change bankruptcy exception.
We Hlustrate the impact of the repeal of the stock-far-debt

{>xception on NOl tax attributes using the following example_
Assume that Company X enters into Cnapter 11 with NOl tax
attributes of $lO~OOO that will expire in 20 years. Assume also
that it triggers an ownership change by exchanging common
equity with debt-holders for impairl>d debt (which it has paid
interest eXp€flse in the amount of $3,000 in the previous throe
years), realizing COD income in the amount of $5,000. As
snown in Figure 1 'Panel A), under prior-law rules firms could
exclude COD income from gross income and not reduce NOl
lax attributes under the stock-for-dcbt exception p(uvid~ they
restructured in Chapter 11 _ The firm mus.t also decide to limit
post-emergence NOls by electing either the enhanced valua
tion or attribute reduction provisions of the ownership change
rule bankruptcy exception. Assuming the enhanced valuation
p(Qvision is chosen and the less restrictive annual limitation
amount is computed to be $500 per year ($50 if the reorganiza
tion occurs as a workout due to the relatively low value of
common equity attributable to the former shareholder group),
the hankrupt firm is restricted to using their pre~change NOls

:.
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over the entire 20 year post-change period, 'I~ Assuming a 6%
discount rate, this reduces the PV of post-emergence NOls to
$5.297 (figure 1, column 3). Under rhe attribute reduction
exception, pre-<:nange NOls are reduced by the appropriate toll
charge (50% of the COD recognized and the interest expense
toll charge to 53,500). The PV of post-change NOLs under
either provision are 5tH! higher than had the firm reorganized
as a workout {$1 ,059) due to the deferral of COO income and
application of the ownership change rule restrictions and em
phasizes the NOL tax benefit of triggering an ownership change
in rather than out of bankruptcy, In contrast; under the current~
law rules. each firm is required to recognize COD income and
reduce NOl tax attributes regardless Qf whether the restructUI'~
ing occurs in or out of Chapter 11. If the restructuring occurs
while the firm is in Chapter 11, firms that elect the enhanced
valuation exception experience" reduction in the number of
years that it can carryforward its annual limitatiQn amount that
the firm (from 20 to 10 years) because there are fewer pre
change NOls available to be pre;e(Ved. This in turn reduces
their level of post·emergence NOLs (in PV terms) by $1,617
(trom $5,297 to S3,680) as opposed to restructuring undet' the
prior-law. firms that elect the attribute reductiQn exception
experien<::e an incremental reduction to NOL tax attributes
equal to 50% of the previously excluded COD income, or
$2,500 (from $4.500 to $2,000). These reductions do not
completely eliminate the tax benefit of triggering an ownership
change in rather than out of bankruptcy due to the substantial
restrictions on annual NOt utilization to firms that restructure
out-of-court,
Newton and Weltheim [l993t predict that bankrupt firms will
respond to the increased tax cost using common equity under
the current law by issuing more debt.." For example, assume
a debtor exchanges common equity with debt-holders for
impaired debt and has the option to: (1) recognize COD ill
come, or {l) discnarge the difference between the market value

or

'S.

this aswmes that the finn was !lOt insolvent at the time it restructured.
If an ownership change WINe not abo triggered, the avplic:atiol'l of the s-tock
(or-debt eKceplilin 'lflow$ Chapler 11 firm!; Iv exit bankruptcy with $5,000
more NOtOJ 3s opposed 10 n:l'Structuring as a woriaJut.
~"In e~lreme ca~! Easton (1994) sugg~ts that the Ims of NOL t.u aft1i·
butes will provide incontive for bankrupt finns to liquid.ilte under Chilptef' 7
r.ilther than reorganize as an on-going business. concern under Chapter 11.
~Vol.!l5.

NI),4--<IlIII'I I'ullSlD)

",.
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of rhe stock and the tax basis of the impaired debt through the
is.suance of a very long-term note with a face amount equal to
the tax basis of the debt that has the minimum allowed interest
rate to avoid the Original Issue Discount Ru'es. In many cases
the second option will be chosen because it reduces the amount
of COD income recognized and allows the firm to approximate
post-emergence NOl levels available under the prior law. It
also allows the bankrupt firm to continue receiving the non-tax
benefits of common equity issuance in Chapter 1 t.

1.

There are, however, costs associated witn (his strategy. First.
issuing more debt redu(:es the firm's long-term survival pros
pects by leaving the bankrupt firm with more debt in its capital
structure. 1t also r~uce5 post-bankruptcy profitabltity througn
increas,E$ in future interest expense charges. Prior research
suggests these two factors may be important in the firm's trade

off between obtaining tax benefib and incurring financial
statement costs (Matsunaga, Shevlin and Shores [19911). If the
tax benefit from issuing more debt is not positive, then the
related financial reponing costs are not relevant. Hcwe~, lor
positive net tax benefits, firms will have incentive to issue more
debt when the marginal tax benefit of pl'eserving NOls exceeds
the marginal financial reporting costs of issuing lTIO(e debt. The
empirical test of this trade-off is as follows: (stated in the
arternative form):

H1 A: firms that restructure in Chapter 11 under the current
law will issue nlore debt if the marginal tax benefit of
preserving NOL tax attributes exceeds tne financial
reporting marginal costs. of issuing more debt.
... OetraKi<.lI;he (1995] suggests IhClf non-I'llc considerOltions play ... primary
in its use (or .J. number of reasons. First. when .. distres!!.ed firm is not
w.ry pru{itctble and reorgani.z~s in bankrup(<:Y, it must obtain suhstarllial debt
forgiven!:!..!; in order tv ~ulVi~ as a going t:oncern. In thi!> instance, common
equity allnw5 creditnrs to grant debtors thfiO debf ro~iveness rht."Y need 10
survive while retaining tile up.~itJe potential to reco~r metr originai invest
ment through future increa~ in firm value. It also m:vgnizes milt the creditor
""55 nas gradually a~stJmed the pns.itkm Qi de facto equity stakehoh:kr ~nd
provides them influenc.:e OW!r fu1ure bu!;ine5S decisions. Debtor! .. Iso benefil
as I::xchcmging impa~red deb. for common equity increase. the probability of
it SU(.;I:t"!Istul reslruc.:(uring by a"uwing the (irm to emerge from ba'lkruptcy with
les!; <l~bt in their capital struc.1ure.
ruJ~
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Sample Selection Method
Current-Law Firm}

We used the lEXIS/NEXIS database to identify firms that
reorganized in bankruptcy between 1995 and 2004 (Curront·
Law firms). This search resulted in an initial sample of 120
firmi. We eliminated 33 firms that did not have the necessary
pre-Firing financial statement information in the year prior to
filing for bankruptcy and/or descriptive information detailing
their bankruptcy restructure plan. Finally, we eliminated eight
firms that resolved their bankruptcy restructuring by merging
with another firm, eleven bankruptcles involving foreign owned
corporations and non-corporate entities (S·Corps), and seven
firms whose bankruptc:y filing was limited to one of its subsidia
ries. This resulted in a final sample of 61 firms. Most sample
firms emerged from bankruptcy between 1997 and 2000 (56)
with the highest number of resorution.s in 1997 (16 fil1ils). Sixty
firms had SIC codes between 1000 and 7000, with fifteen firms
ha.. . ing SIC codes in the- Sooo ranges. This sample consish; of
38 firms. restructured using the traditional Chapter 11 bank
ruptcy filing process (traditional chapter 11 firms) and 23 firms
that restructured using prepackaged bankruptcies (prepaks).
Prior-L'ilw Firms

Using the NMRs database, we obtained a comparison sam
ple of c:orporations lhat emerged from bankruptcy between
1987 and 1994 (prior-Law Firms). This group helps us to
understand wherher the tax and non-tax characteristics of
bankruptc:y filers . . .aried across tax regimes. We considered onlY
firms that emerged from bankruptcy after 1986 to coincide with
the enactment of the ownership change rules as a part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). Consistent with the repeal

'I.

t"1he NMRS and I EXISIN[XIS dalabas.es af{! used as the p'im~ry sources
for our seall;h for two ftSIsons. First. Ihey rontai(l a l.ltge ~ of pubHdy t(~ded
companies including Ihose traded on the New York. American, and OTC stock
exchanges. Seco"d. they include firms involyed in cash and exchange
cli'ferings as well as public offeringr. and private pi ilct'menfS. To supplement
HleSt! data SOIJf(ei, howeller, we also iden(lfied bankrlJpf firm!! uliing the
Natronal Ne~per Index, National Mag~zine Index, the Bal'lkrupf.Cy Data·
source, and 8ankruptcy.com. We ~se the NMR5 databa~ as a SQlJrce to
select the prior-law firm sample sinc;e it j{Jcludes p;..iblk filings throlJgh 1994.
We use the LfXl5INEXlS database <IS one source to SE'lect out current-l1lW
sample group sioce it includes plJblic: filings from 199.1) ro Ihe (:l.Jtrent date.
1'iQtJ3. No.4-(1iIIl1

~t
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of the stock-for.-debt exception, the sample period only extends
through '1994. This group is chosen using the same criteria as
the current-law firm group and consists of 44 firms. MO!tt of
these firms emerged from bankruptcy between lQ90 and 1992
(J8} and had SIC codes betwE'en 1000 and 7000 (41). This
sample consists of 26 traditional Chapter 11 firms and 18
prepaks,

Description of Empirical Tests and R.esult!
fin<mcial and Re-sltl1cture Profiles
Pre-bankruptcy financial profile$ for tile current and prior-law
firm groups are presented in Table 1, Panel A.'"
sets of
firms are, on average, of similar size {total assets and net sales},
nave simHar liquidity and property levers, and catty similar debt
loads into bankruptcy. In addition, they both incurred signifi&
cant losses in the period leading up (0 bankruptcy. Current-law
fi(ms, however, were Significantly less profitable in the pre-filing
period with a negative 41.6% return on average assets c:om~
pared to a negative 17.3% return on average assets tor the prior
law group. Consistent with this finding, 58 currentalaw firms
entered Chapter 11 with pre-existing NOb; averaging 94'%, of
pre-bankruptcy assets. In contrast, 42 of the 44 prior-law firms
entered Chapter 11 with NOLs averaging only 55% of pre

i3<ltn

bankruptcy asselS.
We find also that a majority {54 out of 61 ) of current-law Finns
exchanged common equity with debt-holders for impaired debl,
with the (Offner creditor group owning, on average, 75.9%
the outsranding common equity of tHe newly reorganized firm
<Pand B). This per(:entage is comparable to simi lar former debt
horder equity ownership percentages (or prior law firms
{68.7%). U Reliance on common equity resulted in 53

or

t7 Fifty-ei,;hl C'urrellt-j,lw firm!> acbptl:'d fn>.sh-~lal1 repvt1irtg in d(Otddnce

Wifh the AJ"m'rit:an fnsUtute of <:ertlfied Publ i< Ac(()untants Stat~mt!nt o{
Pusitilu'I CJO-7 "Financial R~por'liog by Fntities in Roorganization Under the
Bankruptcy Code". 0' these finn1l, 56 wrote down their assets to fair market
v,(!lol', As .. result, lhe rt'lalive size imd results of oper.ltiOlls of the prede<:e!>Wf
;.ma ~'Iccessor compal1ies are not compar.lble and not presented in !his

t.

~a:tiQn.

Th~~ (lWfl~hip percenli1~ are also consistent with !timilar stc1tisti(.s
reported in other ~ludics. For example, Tilshj;.:\n. I e<lw" and M~·Connt'1i [19%1
show rhat creditors owned 64.5% of post.bankruptt:y common ~uiry firms
(hal filed prep<tckaged oonkrllptdes between ll)/lO arKl1993. GiiSOll [19c;1(»)

(I'
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cunent·law sample firms t86.91l/n ) triggering all ownel'ship
change {OC firms) .•• This is similar to the percentage of firms
triggering an ownership change in the prior-law group (36 of
42 firms/ or 85.7%). The remaining 8 current-law firms (13.1%)
did not issue sufficient !evels of common equity to trigger an
ownership change (NOC firms}.
Finally, there was

Httle change in the magnitude of COD

income recognized by bankruptcy filers in the current·law

period. Current·law firms reaHzed COO income averaging
46.6% of pre-bankruptcy assets, c:ompared to an average COD
income level of 40.1 % of pre·bankruptcy assets for the prior-law
group. Tnese results suggest t!'lat current-law firms continued
to rely on the combination of issuing common equity to and
obtaining debt forgiveness from creditors to restructure or
replace impaired debt.
Impact of the ChanS!!

itt the Tax Law

Oil

Tax Attribut~

fn this section, we examine whether the lax cost of uSing
common equity increased as a result of the change in tax law.
Using the current~law firm sample, we estimate what the PV
of post-emergence NOl tax attributes woufd have been assum
ing the prior-law rules were in effect. We compare these
amounts to the PVof actual post~emergence NOls. All amounts
are scaled by each firms:' total assets in the year prio,. to entering
into bankruptcy to ~move any size effects that occurred during
the bankruptcy process. We separate t!'le analysis between the
OC and NOC firms since the change in tax law impacts the
NOt tax flttributes of each sub-group differently.
Our initial results suggest that the change in tax law had a

relatively small impact on NOt. tax attribute levels. As shown
in Table 2 (column 1), the application of the ownership change
and Wefs~ 11990J provide ~imilar ~u't.s by showing thilt (re!Hmrs held 79.2%
and 7t .1% of the' po5t.rooQSaniz.Uiun equity of firms that restruclured uliing
t~ Iraditional ChapltN" 11 bankruptcy pmc:ess.
t. Fifty DC firms were directly impacted by me change in tax law because
they exchanged common l'(Juhy with debt·holden. Three OC firms I1'lggered
arH11Nnersnip change I'lot were not impdCted by fuechange in tax law because
lh~y issued common equity to Ihii'd partie5. All tests peri"ormed in this sl.\.idy
Oil the DC firm sub-llteJup indude all :')3 iirm~. rhi> allow.. us to determine
the impact of the change in tax '.lW un the NOl lax be~ftt to all fitm5 that
trigger.m ownen;hip change in Chapter 11. Aillests performed in this $IUd"

were ~run using just the 50 OC firms directly impacted
talC law with no cnange in any inferonces beil'l8 noted.

by the change in

(VoW. No.4--()JKJ1 PIih$lfl)
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rule ba"kruptcy exception under the prior law signiiicantly

reduced the PV ot NOL tax attributes of OC firms from 95,94%
to 56.1 J% of pre-bankruptcy assets. In contrast, the incremental
(eduction in NOl tax attributes attributable to the change in
tax law only reduced NOls bv 18.15% of pre-bankruptcy as!icts
(from 56.93% to 37.98% of p..e-bankruptcy assets). This reduc
tion is not significant at tne usual lEvels (one·tailed). Simila..'y,
the si>:·percentage point inc:rem£>ntal reduction (70.48% to
64.56% of pre-..estruL1ure assets) in NOL tax attributes for the
NOC firms was also small. This is because only th..ee finns in
this group exchange s~ common equity to debt-holders for
impaired debt and received minimal amoun(s of debt
forgiveness,
We find, however, that the above analysis underestimates lhe
overall impact that the change in tax law had on Chapter 11
filel'5 because it does 110t take into consideration Its effect on
their other tax attributes. We take this factor into consideration
by examining the individual effect that deferring COD income
and tne ownership change bankruptcy exception had on each
firm's tax attributes. As shown in Table 3, we find that the
change in tax law divided the OC firm set into three distinct
groups. Con~istent with Easton n9941, 1J
firms (COD firms)
incurred significant explicit tax costs attributable to the changE"
in tax law because they recognized COD income in excess of
their NOl lax attributes (column 1). To avoid current taxation
on the COD income n.'Cogllized (averaging $271 million per
firm;. they were forced to eliminate all of their NOl tax dttri·
butes {averaging $124 million or 61.8% of pre-bankruptcy
assets}. In addition to losing the tax advantage of triggering an
ownership change in bankruptcy, they also lost future depreda·
tion deductions because they were also required to reduce the
baldnces of other tax altributes (p..imarily (he adjusted bases of
depreciable assets) by the amount of excess COD income
recognized (averaging $147 million per iirm, or 26.4% of pre
bankruptcy assets).

ex:

Sl'cond, in contrast to Betker 1199.51, we sh(Jw thilt eighteen
OC iirms elected the attribute provision as a means to preserve
NOt!) fAR firms) despite the asset sale a.nd limmdng restrictions
it pl~lCes on the firm in (he post-bankruptcy periud. As -shown
in l.lble .3, Column 4, AR firms entered Chapfer 11 with high
NOt. oluribute levels averaging 186,.51 % of pre·b.mkruptcy
.(ISSC1S:. While (he COD income recognized (averaging 65.57%
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of pre-bankruptcy assets} is comparable to the COD income
recognized by COO fiO'lls, the AR firms, because of their large
NOls, were still able tu rE:!t~in NOl tax attributes averaging
120.94% of pre-bankruptcy assets. These firms also benefited
from the reduced one-time NOltoli charge afforded to this

provision under the current law to exit bankruptcy with NOL
tax attributes averaging 95.45% of pre-bankruptcy assets, or $82
mimon per firm. Had AR firms elected the enhanced valuation
provision, we estimate that they would have exited bankruptcy
with NOls averaging $37 million (in PV terms), or 21.10% of
pre-bankruptCy assets. As a result, electing the attribute reduc
tion over the enhanced valuation provision allowed these firms.
to preserve an additional $45 million in NOl tax attributes (or
74.400/0. of pre-bankruptcy assets). These mean differences (in
dollars Of percentages) are significant at the 0.01 level (one-
tailed), In addition, we estimate that AR firms would have
recognized NOl tax attribute levers of only $ 5 million or 2.90%
of pre-bankruptcy assets, had they had reorganized in a work
out. As a result, they were able to emerge from bankruptcy with
additional NOt. tax aHribute5 averaging $77 million, or 92.6%
of pre·restructure assets, by re;truc:turing in bankruptcy, relative
to a workout. These differences are significant at the 0,01 level
of significance (one-tailed).
The remaining 21 ex::: firms continued to use the enhanced
valuation provision to preserve NOls (EV firms). Consistent with
Setker 119951, had they elected the .attribute reduction provi
sion, most would have lost substanlially all (0( afl) of their NOL
tax attributes.- Similar to COO firms, EV firms are character~
ized by relatively tower fevels of pre-bankruptcy NOL levels
{57.4% of pre-restructure assets). However, they were able to
retain significant tax benefits; averaging $33 million per firm
or 12.7% of pre·bankruptcy assets, in part because they recog·
nized significantly smaller amounts of COD income than AR
or COD firms.

Debt. Rr;.>5truclVre Characteristics
in this section, we examine whether firms issued more debt
to minimize the adverse impact of the change in tax law on
NOt t~x attributes. ThIS is done by comparing Ihe relative mix
ao Throe tirm~ elected the enh.'lnC.ed v~luation provi!tion because their debt
restructure m~hod did nnt allow them to qualify for ItIe attribute reduction
j)ro\lision.
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of cash. securities (common equity or debt) and debt forgiveness
given in consideration for impaIred debt by current-law firms
to similar percentages utilized by prior-law firms. All amounts
are stated as a percentage of total debt (~structured. A research
finding that current law bankruptcy filers Issued more debt in
bankruptcy to reduce COD income level$ is consistent with tne
prediction of Newton and Wertheim [19931. On the other ha.nd,
results that i ndka1e that bankrupt firms did not alter- now they
restructure their debt under the current law are consistent with
the assertion of Betker [1995J.
The rest! Its of tne debt restructure mix comparisons are shown
in P,lnel A o( Table 4. We pres(!nt results separately for EV, AR
and COO firms since the previous test indicate$ that EV firms
realized rower COD income levels that AR/COD firms. The
results for current-l.aw firms are presented in Panel A. Panel 8
includes tht! restructurE! statistics for the prior-law group. COD
firms dId not exist in the prior period since their 1055 of NOls
can be traced dire<:tly to the repeal of the stoCk~for-debt excep
tion. The prediction of Newton and Wenheim (1993) that firms
would utilize more debt in bankruptcy are supported only for
the EV group. These firms exchanged significantly higher levels
of new debt in reorganization (averaging 21.81% of impaired
debt) than prior· law EV firms (averaging 11 .16% of impaired
debt). in addition, the percentage of new debt in the cUfTent·law
EV firm reorganization package was significantly higher than
tne amount of debt issued by either current-raw AR firms
(averaging 11.51 % o( impaired debt) or COD firms (averaging
9.15% of impaired debtl. Consistent with the results noted in
the previous test, the higher issuance of EV firm debt was mel
by a commensurate decrease in the amount of debt forgiveness
~averaging 34.85% of impaired debt). This percentage was
sigmficantly lower than comparable amounts realized by prior
law f.V firms (averaging 46.32% of impaired debt>, current law
AR (.weraging 52.03% of impaired debt> and COD firms (aver
aging 58.57% of impaired debt). On the other hand, the mix
of c.;lsh, stock, debt and debt forgiveness offered by current-law
AR iirms for impaired debt did nol differ (rom the packages of
AR iirms from the prior period or COD firms in the current
period.2'f Finally, we show that NOC were largely unaffedcd
2' (no firms did nul e~j~t in the prior petittd since Iheir los!> of NOh can
Uto lr,It:1:'d (iirec:rly to the repe<ll of the s.tock-for-dd1t elt.ception.
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by the change in tax law because they primarily used cash to
pay down impaired debt or restructured the terms of existing
debt contracts.
To unde~taJ1d why only EV firms issued more debt, we
estimate their associated marginal tax benefit and financial

reporting costs. We include in this analysis AR/COD firms but
exdude NOC firms irom consideration since they were largely
unaffected by the cha.nge in tax law. For EV firms, we es.timate
what their po5t~emergence NOl. debt and pre-tax profitability
levels would have been had they elected to maintain their debt
usage at prior-period levels (approximately 11 .16% of impaired
debt). We then compare these estimated amounts to actual post·
emergence levels ror these variables. The results, as shown in
Table 5, column 1. s~ow that rhe reduction in the level deOO
income due to increased debt utilization allowed EV firms to
increase post-emergence NOl tax attributei (in PV terms) by
76.41 %, from 10.&% to 18.7% of post-emergence assets. This
benefit was realized despite an incremental increase of post
emergem::e debt loads of only 31 .61 % and reduction in post
bankruptcy profitability ot 6.13%. These results are consistent
with hypothesis Hl A,a Increased debt utilization in Chapter
11 increased post-emergence debt ratios from 42% (based on
our estimate of what po~t"emergence debt ralios would have
bc!en had EV firms maintained debt usage at prior period levels)
to 56% of post-emergence asset's. The "'as-if'" percentage is

comparable to similar post-emergence debt ratios for prior-law
EV firms and current-law AR and COD firms. In contrast, their
actllal posf-emergence debt ratios are significantly higher (at tl1e
0.01 level, two-tailed. than simHar ratios for AR and COD firms.
These results consistent with the concerns of Newton and
Wertheim [19931 that the increased debt usage of firms in
response to the change in tax law would forte bankruptcy filers
-It is possible, howfoVer. mal EV firm1i issued more debt

00(

necessarily

to preserve NOls but rather because !bey hlld the debt capa6ly to do w.

We test for this pos.sibility by oomparjl'lg EV fifm post-bankruptcy debt levels
to ~Imilar amounts lOt' AR ar1(i COD rrrms. AlQuming that tV finns maintained
their dt!bt usage at prior period levels, we es~imate that thev would h.ave
emerKE!d from Chapfer 11 with post-bankruptcy debt ratios averaging 42%
[)I post-emergence total assels. This ratio is higher (though 001. signiticanlly
so) Ihan similat' ratiV5 for AR firms (averaging )6% of luLl I po5t.em~nce
total a~li!:!ts) and COD linns (;lverilging 28% of po5t-emergence Iotoll anets).
This result mes flO( suppoi1 this allt.'ITlative exp4anation for intreased EV finn
debt uliage.

q 31
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emerge from bankruptcy with morl? debt in theIr capital

structure.
In contrast, we find that AR and COO firms would not have
benefited from issuing more debt under the current law. Assum
ing that AR firms issued more debt in bankruptcy equal to levels
maintained by EV firms (approximately 21.81% of impaired
debt}. they would have only realil.ed an 8% increase in their
level of post~emergence NOls while incurring an 80% increase
in post-emergence debt as the reiatively large NOl t<lX attribute
batances result in relatively lOWEr marginal tax benefits from
issuing more debt. COD firms also would not have benefited
from issuing more debt because only 4 or 13 firms would have
preserved any NOls tax attributes by increasing their debt
usage. This is because COD recugnized by the other 9 firms
would still have excreded pre-existing NOl tax attribute levels,
even after the additional debt issuances. The small NOl tax
savings would have come at the cost of a 94% increase in
current debt levels and a doubling of their pre-tax losses. These
results suggest that firms trade~ff the tax benefits of preserving
NOls against the financial reporting costs of higher debt loads

and reduced profitability.
Prepackaged

vef3:US

Tfddition,,1 Chi:lph?r 11 Bankrul!,tcies

Prior research has suggested tha( taxes ma.y play a role in
encouraging firms to file a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganiza
tion for two reasons (McConnell and Servais, 1993). first.
prepaks know their debt restructure method (and availab'e tax
benefits) prior to filing for bankruptcy. Second, prepaks may
represent a low-cost way of achleving these benefits because
the length of time (and cost) that tne firm is expected to stay
in bankruptcy is le'is because most creditors have already
agreed to the terms of the restructuring plan {Tashjian, lease
and McConnell, 1996). Because of these daims, we next
examine pr-epaks and traditional Chapter 11 fi..ms separately to
ensure that are results are not driven by one of the groups.

\\'e find that no support for concerns that inc.entives for

prepaks vs. other filers. might lead to differing tax results.
Instead, we find that prepaks and traditional chaptet' 11 firms
recognized similar levels of COD. While prepaks rccognlzed
sligntiy higher COD income levels than traditional chapter 11
filers (53 5% vs. 42.5% of pre-restructure assets). the mean

difference is not Significant at the usual leve!s. 1n addition, the

Ai
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relative:! composition of prepaks between EV, AR, COO and
NOC firms is similar to the traditional Chapter 11 group. Of
interest is that 8 of 23 prepaks were willing to restructure in
Chapler 11 without receivjng any tax related benefits. One
prepak debt reslructure pian did not require the triggering of
an own(!r~hjp change and seven prepaks recognized COD
income in excess of pre-restructure NOls. Of the remaining 15
firms, 8 elected the enhanced valuation exception while" firms
chose the attribute reduction exception. As wirh the lraditional
chapter 11 group, both EV and AR prepaks preserved significanl
NOl levels upon emerging from bankruptcy. however, the
prImary benefit from triggering an ownership change in bank~
ruptcy was attributable to AR firms.. Finally, we show that both
traditional Chapter 11 and prepak EV firms Issued more debt
in bankruptcy as compared to AR or COO firms in order to
preserve the NOL tax attribute. As a result, il a.ppears that firms
that restru<.1ure using the traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy
process as we" as those that use prepackaged bankrUptcies
value the tax benefits provided by the ownership change bank
ruptcy exception similarly.

Conclusions
This paper investigates how the repeal of the stock-for-deht
exception how firms restrudured while in Chapter t 1. Consis
tent with claims made by Easton (J 994}] , we find that the
change in tax law imposed significant explicit lax costs 011
bankruptcy illers. Despite these costs, we find that many of
these firms altered their debt restructure method to preserve
NOls and reduca their cost of equity. We document that
concerns raised by Newton and Wertheim {1993) are justified
since almost half of our sample firms issued significant levers
of debt while in Chap[cr 11. Additionally, approximately a third
of these firms responded to the change in lax law to preserve
NOls by ele<.."ting an alteroati...e provision available under the
owner!Yhip change rule bankruptcy exception that allows for a
one-time reduction in NOl tax attributes. We also show that
the remaining fIrms were precluded from changing their debt
restructure method, despite the loss of all of their NOL tax
attributes, becaose the financial reporting marginal costs of
doing SO exceeded any marginal tax benefits that might have
been generated. Finally, we find that the imp.ld of the repeal
of the stock-lor-dent exception on corporate bankruptcy
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reorganizations was similar for firms that filed for prepackaged
bankruptcies and fkms that restructured using the traditional
Chapter 11 process. We conclude that. in addition to non,talC
factors, taxes appear to be an important consideralion in how
firms restructure while in Chapter 11.
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due to u.: IIIlpticlilioll ut lhe I)wnmhip eban,e bl!nkn!plcy
1'II!r;~O!l.
Itepmoellb ~ion

io. the PV uf NOll'. asslJ.lDin, that tbl;
NOI..I Ullin, !he enlwlolx! vallWiol1

rum e!CC:1i to ~1Ie
jlfOVi.siOll.

Represent' miuctio'll in fbi: PV of NOLs IS5UIlIillll 61. the
pre~ NOLs I~\in& thr. auribwe m.!nc:tim
pm'Iillion.
Reprt$e1llS the PV or JIOII'-e!l'lI!rjle!1QC NOL II.~ IIlU'ibulfS
IIISSUmid& III uWlIoI:nhip cha"F tIa$ tAlen t . d .
Rcp~ the PV of .tiRlill!)d !'oiOL tu. anribules
a5sumin; !be r!rJD had l'C:(1J~b.c'd l1li .II 'Hl)rkoot.

fifJII eleeti to

'fable 1

CUMpUl10Wft

vI t"inwlejal. nIX urul RmJVr.rure
C!II"Rm[·I,aw
Htll\5.-

Vlriat-lc

Proji/f!J

PrlEX'-Law
I;itm..."

Pautl A: Prt-R'Ibc
FInImdII Pro. .
221.461
194,226
'2.947
0.36:1

1\55111"

Saln
Cutn:1lt 1I:1IOn
Pf'E K;,W.o
Do:bt ~
BOA
NOlI.tIIIria

20l.~61

un!

ll2,.l7S
2.2'Oi
11.325
n.82:5

-'l..:I.] 0

·O.t73°·

O.'Y.l~

0550t

Pa.ae18:~

PnlIIles

EqIJ;ty bio
COD R1aUtt:

0.7:59
0.687
OAOI
1..1.466
Indi.clJcs sigairlCllft~ • dlc 0.0;; 1e~1 usi. a tw~ided test. fill" AMlCiS
and ~ the rDeaIl ditTemlllX kIllS II!: j'lCrfia'axId llSio, the lWIlutal lug
8IlJOU1'Ib;.

A

Cu.tn:1It-Law flrmI AKlfJlmiled io bukrup!1.'}' bctwilc:n 1995 lind !004.
Sample ,i1lC is 61 f,l'ffII,. Prior-Law fitms reorpnizaJ in bllll'lknlplcy
be;tWiileI 1987 and 1994. Sa1npl\l ,iu: is 44 1innI;.
TOOlI. auets irI !.he )'CIII.' price '0 nliq fur banbuptcy. All'IDIIIlll presenmd
.wore :mc:diM afllOlJ.Rt9..
N« &aIn in the: year prior to fthn£ f(W: ba~y. Amo1llllS pn:!!S4il1lkd
iW lhCdian .-ru>lI1U.
Tb!:: meat nr egm.n( 6'III:U divIded by alma( Jiahilidcs (less !he cllOall
portion of 1Mg.teml ddll) It rhe end of t~ jUt' pri« to filinS f(lf
ban~IM'Y·

kOA

'Thr: meat of IICI ~y phms lind IIqwpllxm divk\lCd by IOLW 1.'I.Sd.t II
Ihr. end "r the rear priut to /iIi.. f~ tllUltropICy.
MIliA of : Slim of loog tcm'l ckbI ~11lS rhe C\lrn1U pl1rtion tI! lonr;'1e11D
debt (Ii. vide!! by loa.! Id",,~ aI. the c$d of lhe year pri~ t(l filiAl. ler
bdknlptey.
The mean of nel inr::I)IUC (bIlfi)ft ~m.-utdilWy ik:Jnr. ano Will) di\'ldl;d
by avet.J&l: 1IW15 at Ihe eod or '!be l"CUt priot Itt ruillg tnr brIInknqMq.
l\.kaa of Not. w. iJ.IIribule> divided by rota! ~ at lilt: end "l the: year
priuc 10

fili~

Ptm:e-,e

of

debt-h.il~".

fnr b.uIknlpt~.
r.:UI.\ImI:ln tlqllit)' 1D _ly n:~iu:d tirm held by
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COD i/lQ)lI'Ire t'eIlOPized scaled b, rota! ~ al Ihr:: end of It.; 1QI'
prilli' to tHi1l1 (Of bankrupte)'.

COD klltio

Table 1
IflertPfUMwl COlli MU)(:/«rN With ClIMgt 111 1(jx 14JW

lAlS4:riplion
1"rl::-8k NOi.sI

Prior Lcl...· R{!fillrJifllll
Fri"r-Law N0liI,8
Cl4rrtll.l I.,..• RIIfiM("ti",,1

"_-BR NOu·

OC Fir&A
NOC fIimIs"
Q.']Oq
0.9;94
(<t.OOOO)
lO.39II,
0.5613"
0.7048
(O.05~:Z)
(0.181S)
0.6(56
0.319&
Meurt difft:n:ftl'le bt.!twllell (1) P.re·BR I'IOLs ¥s. 014 I..owt

NOl..s, or (2) Old L..... NOLr. Q:. PtIIit-BR NOLa is
.. the O.SII- 1eooel usilll • one-sided tat.
OC IiI1n$ III\l IOII1IPIe t"lrms that Lri. .rcd DWlJC11imp
cJdtIfi. Sample size iI S:; firms. !'fOC ftnm did not
lriacr an owncn;l1ip .:hanp. 5unple m.e ia 8 (D'I'tIIi.
All allIOOL1lS 3l!l lCaIed b)' toIal UIlII:U in . . yw prior
w fiIillS for baninJpt(;y.
~i,&iIi.fil;llIlt

B
fve.BR NOLs
Prior Law Rt:doctioo

Repmc:nts 'pre·btnlml~1 No(' IU ~,
«be fYV of NOL b1.. ~
under the prior .........
ReprewnlS the pV of poR-bankruptc)' NOt.. IP. anribula
undc:r the prillr Iii....
1tttl1'tKn!& lbt: reduairJll iJ)

~~I1'S

rtw:

rcQIJctioo in

ta.:

I'V M NOl. IBX at:trl~

lIflribllla!:lJe «l the ctlaqe in ~ law,
RepmieOiJ, lhe PV uf pau-emetgella; NOL tall aluiboleS

I'tJ&t-BR NOl.s

under the

CWRllt'laW.

Table 3

AN.riY.fi.~ (if

con WilPM aNi awllu.vnip C1raJr!J'! Illilf: Reslril:limr., INI NOb.
OC

EV

Variable

firms'

AR
Hr'IIIf'

COD

NOC F""'"

Fi~
0.5740

1.8651 1

f~
O.35J4~

(O.3:S64)

lCl.65S1Jl

(0.617:41)1

Net NOu·
uS$: OC

0,1176'
(O.O!U6)

1.2094"',1

0.0000'

0.6456

lO.2.S48Jl

{O.f~)

(0.000:1)

Rule
RelitJidkJ..a
Patf-BR

0,1)4\)

O.oooot

0.6456

0.0000

0.64-'6

Pn:-8R
NOua
lI.\ss: COD

0.7041

(0.059'1)

R.eduction"

NOLa"
WmktNt

0.0290'

NQI..$.
d.i~Clce~ hetWCI:lI: (I) P!l:·RR NOLs ..... Nel NOLs,. (Z) Net
NUl ... 11$. PoJI-8R NOLs, 01' (3) ~·8R NOlI \IS. Wcn.ool NOU is
siPlificut lit the 0.10. O.~, ( r O.fIl k"dl., TC-.'i('C(.1:i ....ely, U5iDJ_
iJllC·r.ilcd 1l:.'It.

I\.lCIIJI

McaJI diffi:~noe bcf\t\oeen (I} EV 3IId AR rllll\S Of (2) .EV ...... COD
IimlSo is IOignili(aDt ilt the 0.01 IUId o.~ 1ew:1~ Ilf sipificaooe,
respt:(Ii...eiy. lDiiag Iwn-!3iicd te:stI.
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OC firms III'C £II1'I\I. tiIIl tnl;gero! n.... nerstill chan"" {s.ampll: 5i& is S3l.
The: DC IimI groop d di~ itllo !hm: ~: EV fi.nslS elected I~
f:!Ihan~ valuation Cltcqlli.:lll (54IlT.Tp1t ~ite is 21); A'R finno da:[ed die:
.Dibole mhsction provision (wnplc ~11.C is IS); COl) (inns; did Q\ll
ilellefit from 1ri~8Crl... an ~hjp change bca.Iue Ihcir COD i!I(1)'!.M
~ pnl-l:lar:!.knlpU:y r«lL tax lII.{ribllles (Mmpk: IiiIJll IJ fiInut. NOC
rums 1ft fil't115 tIIa1 did lIat lria;er all \lWJ1~ cli4In.\I'C (SarIl'le &j:z.c is
8).
All amooDls ate scilkd by IUlaJ aw:t~ ill the yew priur to lilin$ Car

B

l;iar1bvpU:y.

Rcpn:5CIIfS pre-banlcrupli:}' NOL I!IX atttibules.

Pre·ilR
NOLs
COD
R~tioa

OC
Rl:dlX'!ion
Posl-UR
Not.",
WUftQ1Jl

krptl!SCOU roducrioa in NOt.. tIU attributtl ..nbwabJe » COD incO'/'llC
fWQPilioD IIllder thi: ~1Iot law.
Repmrcpb. lite reduction in ,he f'V or NOL 1.llJl anrib4n& due to lhe
.applicalilm of !he ownmhip cbange bIIlkNptIlj' nUe UlXlfllioo.
Repn:&el'ltll Ihc PV
Refjle!lCift6
I'l!!.~xd

NOL;

or poS!~mcrg.mQt NOL Iv;

attribllll'lS.

thr PV of eSlimaIl:ldN<X.In.I1.ibUleSI5$Utt1.i1\g dle fimJ tu.d
» I wothU.

Table 4
AIlalyJ!,s of OC Firtlf I)tbl R~li/rl4etul'f .v~tbud

EV

Fi~

OCfllll15
A'R

COD

NO('

Fil'llll

filTM"

f"~

7.9~

4.34
21.95

29.0:3"
9.88'

9.14'S8.j1'"

41.4.16·
14.0.\

Cun't'llt-Law
Vlrnu....

came

Common I:'qJilr
IlebtC

Debt 1Jisc:~e
PaDd B: Prior-Law

9.96
.l3.38
lUll
34.11:5

~:!.f~l'"

7.171
34.'9

1~.26

l2.)1

28.60

11.19

2&51
11.51·'

f:iirJ

Casne':
('lJOlJJIOO

OcI:tlC

f.qunr

Debf Oil!chul!t!;:
,.

A

H

II.I~

9.IS

37.~B

%..)22.
4.99
28.99
Meu diffilrence bctwe.ea (1) f,v SlId AR fllPl5 !iIId (2) EV ;111(1 COD
IiI"ll"G IIIld (3) EV rrl"lT1l!o wad NOC fiml5 i!; sigrrificlIlIl • I~ O.(t\ level of
slllllifiClllK'e UIoidg iI 1W~·lailcd le&t.
Mean difference bcl_ CIlt.rent L_ IIl'Id Prior-'a",' fU"lll MOOUftt, i$
'irniflQlllt III 1.he 0.00 level uf ~jglljfiC8llQl (two-tailed li;:5I).
~ OC fi rID pDlIp j, divided. II1I1l three gTOtlpIIi: EV firms clctlCd. t.hr
c:nhamled valll8tiOIl cmccpciOG {smlpll: ~ is lZ tor l~nt-Ij)"" tinn5 and
24 foc prillr-law (jnm;~ AR fmllS elc:Clod lhi: tllirilrutc R:duc.1XI1tl ptWkioo
(~1e rJu Is 111 fur tum:1Ii·law tirms and 3 tor pr1tw-law firmn; COO
til'lT15o did 001 be!leflt from tri&&cring :IJ\ D'Wnr:nh.ip \'i1an~ I!r:t:auK lhei,
000 ilXorne ~ pre·rat['llClure NOLs (s....,1t: size 13 foc
COfl't:lII-la'lll rut~). NOC firma; ore flf'll1& thai did fIOl lri.r ... ClWIlIldNp
dtmge (sample size iiO g fur CUrTI:nl I:.!.... .tifl1'ls and 6 ror priOf·law 1'i1"ll"G).
ClIm:RI-Luw ril'!l'lS l'CIQrpIliZl':d ill NTlkrapll!)' between 1911:; IlJId 2004.
SatrIpIe six is 61 filTllS. PriOJl-l.aw ....11'J11i !'eOfgI¥Ii~ ill OOnktupIq
0,:1_ 1997 and 1994. SIII..1e size i~ 44 firms. There is [lC~ II COD
rltln _poup with \he prior-Isw firms due t~ Ita!: appiiL:alioo of f1'lc:
stud· rm'-..Jtbt Il!l'lXprion.
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RCpreKiRts telatiYI! amoonl of cash /wnJmoo equityldelltldebt f<qi~
UIIICd to ~piaoe impaited dcht. All IfflOUfll5 am stlted .... ~p: of
\he tmI ~bt discllarl:Jed in bdnIptcy.

TIMeS
&mefits tmJ (.itl/s rJf bIlling 1,,:ldilWIflJI D,rb,

I'add A: EV t1nIIe
As Ir: No Additionat Debe BM:haI!ged
N:t1&aI
t'etcelll ~ (~)
had II: AR. rrrJ
Actual
A5 If: Issued More Dt-bt
PI:~

NOL·

DEB-re

ItO,,

0.100

0.421
0.}6l'"
3161..

.Q.\60

0.137'"
7~.41 "

-4.180

(U3'1o)

InerQIC (0ec1'l:il:Wll)

PIt.tId c: (.."00 J!b:mIo
Anbat
0.000
0.369
·0.030
Ail Ir~ IaKOOd Moll'l Deb!
0.00
O.1l'·
-0.000
h.n:elt OtanI!:
94.3111
(loo.QOIi)
...... ..,
Mean 4if'rcrmcc ~Ii ..Act...... Inll "As·if' l!8lOOJlI.Ii: i~ sil'1irlaMll • ~
0.10. OJ). Ie\'lll of silDi~ (lJIIr",aikd).
TIle OC 6rm group ill di\lided iato tbme poops: EV firlm eJedJ:,d ~
A
~ Va/Wlaoo J::I(eption (saIllf"ic si;a! is 21); AR finnII Llledlld tb;
BIlribvle ~lICtiDIIl jII"t:IVi$i"" (1IIq:IIe siI.e ia 1S); roD firms did IIOf bt:nc:ftt
1'ron1 mglJ.illj'l lilt ~ip change OOcautl! I.hr:ir COD iOCOOJe eXl:~

Nt'"

pn:-~~

8

C

D

NOt

NOLs (~ size 13 fltW).
PV of post~ltIIlf'IIence NOt IIU ..mblila. DEBT is, tlH:::

n:pR~t ...

sum uf IOOi-lCf1TI debt plWi It.: cum:11( portion or UJnr-llmll dcbI. Bolli NOL
aDd DEBT an: QW lJy I«4l 8,!;K~ • lhe end of t¥ ~ aftu lICit rum
Crl"Iltpld fnlm hanlTuptcy. ROA i..!; !he p!1:__ tehlm OIl a~ asKII
{before e.ttta-ontinlDy ilelR!l} ill tlw: first )"0lIl" . r adI. r...... eD¥:op:d fio.m
bal1luuplcy.
'rhis '1IIlysis euirlllllcs the }'V or 1I'l61-e_rpCl: NOl..a, DEBT IIIId ROil.
IWllmin, thai ~Kh £\1 rll1ll did 001 isslle [a(."I1mII:lQlly ~ ..,. U}
ds:btholde.,. lit ;,:ompaII!d bJ prior-law flm\S. Tbc5e ....if" eidmare8 :an! !hen
~ '0 IdUlli 8IIIOOlI15 for NOJA DEBT. IIDIi lOA.
This aMI)'m I:lliRlllln lhe PV of ~·cI11lltgflDre NOLa. DEBT lUId ROA
wwnirlg !hal e~ AR aDd COD iAsl.IC4 illC~lIWll)' ~ debt to
debllloldm si.ulilar en F.V flmw. Thcac: "¥-it~ estimalls ~ IIw:o compared
Iii IICt\IIJ a.TIIOOJtlS fur NOlA. DEBT. IU1d kOI\

